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1. Introduction: Bradley’s Reductio of Relations 
Bradley’s most systematic attack on relations occurs in Book 1, Chapter III 
(Relation and Quality) in Appearance and Reality (1893): 
 
(1) Qualities without relations are impossible, or at least not fully intelligible 
(AR, III, 21–5).1 
(2) Equally with qualities together with relations (AR, III, 25–7). 
(3) Relations without qualities or relata are “nothing” (AR, III, 27). 
(4) Relations with qualities or relata are “unintelligible” (AR, III, 27–8).2 
 
We shall call these intertwined arguments “Bradley’s reductio of relations”. 
Their context consists of the problem Bradley poses in the beginning of 
Chapter II (Substantive and Adjective): What is the relation between “a thing” 
and its “properties”? (AR, III, 16.) In order to solve this problem of monadic 
inherence, Bradley soon proposes that the thing is its properties in a relation 
(AR, II, 17). His example is that a lump of sugar as a unity would be white, 
sweet and hard in some relation (AR, II, 16–7). However, then we face the 
problem how many entities (plurality of properties), even in a relation, 
constitute one entity (a unity) over and above the many (addition to being). 
This unity-in-complexity or complex-unity problem leads to the discussion of 
properties, or relata, and relations in Chapter III. 
Typically, the entire Bradley’s reductio of relations is ignored or set aside 
in contemporary metaphysics and only the relation regress occurring in the 
fourth part is discussed. However, when we are responding to Bradley, it is 
                                                
1 References to Bradley’s Appearance and Reality are to the second edition (1897), hereafter cited as 
“AR” followed by chapter and page numbers. 
2 Bradley uses “term” instead of “relatum” but we take it for granted that “relatum” and “relata” 
are unproblematic here. 
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not sufficient that we respond to the second strand of the second horn of his 
dilemma in the fourth argument, which is known as his relation regress or just 
“Bradley’s regress”. We have to be as certain as possible that our response is 
not subject to his reductio of relations in Chapter III since these arguments are, 
indeed, intertwined. They consist of several eliminative moves, the most 
relevant of which for the present purposes are the relation regress and 
especially Bradley’s relata regress. With the relata regress, he intends to show that 
the relata of any given relation fall apart into an infinitely complex non-
terminating tree of alleged relations and their relata. Therefore the initial 
relata are not unities (see more below). Consequently, since Bradley thinks 
that relations presuppose relata as unities (AR, III, 27), relations are not fully 
intelligible. 
Bradley’s relation regress and relata regress have the common critical 
target that any plurality of entities is not fully intelligible since every plurality 
of entities presupposes holding of relations, at least the holding of numerical 
distinctness. For the sake of these arguments, Bradley assumes that there is a 
plurality of entities and then attempts to show that any possible manner of 
understanding this is not ultimately fully intelligible. Hence, given Bradley’s 
view that being fully intelligible is a necessary condition for being true and 
fully real, existence pluralism is not the truth and the world according to 
existence pluralism is not and cannot be fully real (AR, III, 28). 
However, looked at from another angle, one may respond to Bradley by 
showing that there is an intelligible way of understanding existence pluralism. 
This is not question-begging against Bradley because it does not assume the 
full intelligibility of existence pluralism. One thing one has to do in order to 
defend this response to Bradley is to argue that it is indeed fully intelligible 
that entities are related and these relations do not fall afoul of either of 
Bradley’s regresses. Bradley’s eliminative moves in them are not exhaustive of 
possible views on relations. So we can tell how Bradley’s relation and relata 
regress and his entire reductio of relations, indeed, can be avoided from arising, 
which differs from solving the regress problems. This is what we intend to do in 
this paper. Our focus will be on formal ontological relations, some of which at least 
do not fall prey to Bradley’s reductio of relations. So we shall argue. 
The paper has a dual character. It includes both reconstructions of 
Bradley’s regresses and a systematic treatment of them. We have to do this 
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because our intention is both to convince contemporary metaphysicians of the 
power of Bradley’s arguments and to be fair to Bradley, even if we cannot be 
fair to all of his intentions. This paper is systematic metaphysics, which gains 
from a scholarly work on Bradley. One also has to make an argument as solid 
as possible if one intends to answer the argument; there are already too many 
straw men in philosophy. So we have to dig deeper into Bradley than is 
usually done in contemporary metaphysics. 
We begin in §2 with Bradley’s relation regress, which leads to the 
discussion of how this regress may be avoided (§3). §4 is devoted to Bradley’s 
relata regress and its critique. In §5, we shall show that there may hold formal 
ontological relations which escape the entire reductio of relations. Before the 
summary (§7), there is a coda (§6), which is a brief remark on relational 
thought and language. 
 
2. Relation Regress 
Arguably, Bradley’s problem in his relation regress argument is how relation r 
is able to stand to two distinct qualities or relata, a and b. By his talk of 
“relating”, Bradley apparently means that r is a determinate property of a 
kind and that r relationally inheres in a and b. For example, r is the distance of 2 
m, which relationally inheres in a and b. One may compare this with monadic 
inherence in which a property (e.g. 1 kg mass) inheres in a bearer 
(object/substance). So r’s relating a and b involves both being a determinate 
property and relationally inhering in a and b. Secondly, Bradley thinks that r 
connects a and b, which means uniting a, b and r into a single relational 
complex aRb (Wieland & Betti 2008, 509–11; Betti 2015, 39–41).3 
The explanandum in Bradley’s relation regress is therefore the state of 
affairs4 that (1) r is a determinate property, (2) r relationally inheres in a and b, 
and (3) r connects a and b. The problem that the regress poses is to give a 
metaphysical explanans for this explanandum: which entities account for the 
                                                
3 Consequently, the relation regress problem is not the same as the complex-unity problem, the 
special case of which is only part of the former problem. 
4 Our talk about states of affairs does not presuppose the ontological commitment that they are 
entities in the category of facts. 
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obtaining of the state of affairs that r relates a and b by connecting them.5 
Bradley’s conclusion is that finding the explanans leads to a vicious infinite 
regress. Since r is an arbitrary existing relation, the vicious infinite regress has 
the consequence that there can be no metaphysical explanation for the state 
of affairs that an existing relation relates its relata by connecting them.6 
Bradley’s relation regress starts by assuming, for the sake of the 
argument, that the existence of r itself as a thing explains the state of affairs that 
it does relate by connecting a and b. What this must mean at least is that r is a 
distinct entity: it is an addition to being, a third entity in relation to its relata a 
and b. It is actually this that generates the relation regress according to 
Bradley. 
The next step in the regress is Bradley’s crucial assumption that r not 
only relates a and b by connecting them, it itself must also be related and connected to 
both of a and b. Hence, the only way for r to relate by connecting a and b is 
bearing relations and being connected to both a and b. On the assumptions of 
the argument, this can happen only if there are two additional relating and 
connecting entities. Thus, there is a new relation r1 that relates by connecting 
r and a and a new relation r2 that relates by connecting r and b. From this, an 
infinite regress of relations is generated, given that Bradley’s argument goes 
through, by returning to the beginning in the case of r1 or r2.7 So the regress 
has actually the structure of a tree with infinitely many levels: 
                                                
5 In this paper, we do not take any positive stance on the difficult metametaphysical question 
what metaphysical explanation is. We try to do metaphysical explanation, and characterize it 
only negatively: it is not causal. 
6 To be precise, Bradley’s ultimate conclusion from the relation regress is that r’s relating a and b 
by connecting them is not the truth and fully real. This stems from his view that being fully 
intelligible is a necessary condition for being true and fully real, which does not hold of r’s relating 
by connecting a and b (AR, III, 28). 
7 For a closely similar argument, see Bradley’s first work The Principles of Logic (1883, 96), which 
was published ten years before Appearance and Reality (cf. Allard 2005, 61–66). There is also a 
version of the relation regress in Chapter II of Appearance and Reality. It has the slightly different 
form that first we need a two-place relation (e.g. instantiation), then a third-place relation and so 
on ad infinitum (the adicity of the relations ascends into infinity vs. infinite number of distinct 
applications of a multigrade relation). This is the way Armstrong (1997, 114), Cameron (2008) 
and Gaskin (2008, 314–6), for instance, understand Bradley’s relation regress. We focus on the 
form of the regress advanced by Bradley in the chapter discussing relations (III). 
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Level 0 aRb 
Level 1 aR1r rR2b 
Level 2 aR3r1 r1R4r rR5r2 r2R6b 
…  
 
Independently from Bradley’s reasons for the infinite regress being vicious, 
there is a convincing argument to the result that the regress is, indeed, vicious. 
Rickie Leigh Bliss (2013) has argued that the regress is vicious because on 
each consecutive level of the tree, the explanandum and the components of 
explanans are of the same type (cf. Armstrong 1978, 106). The explanandum is that 
distinct entities are related and connected by a distinct relational entity (aRb). 
The explanans is to repeat infinitely that distinct entities are related and 
connected by a distinct entity (xRny). So the explanans consists of what is type-
identical to the explanandum; both are of the type xRny. Consequently, nothing 
at all has been explained metaphysically about distinct entities being related 
and connected by a distinct entity (xRny). This problem is just repeated 
infinitely. The connecting relations form an infinite tree of entities accounting 
for r relating a and b by connecting them.8 The tree structure does not 
terminate; the lowest level does not exist. Hence, no step is taken to explain 
metaphysically aRb.  
It is quite clear that the relation regress makes two assumptions about 
relations. If there can be an account of relations that does not have to make 
those assumptions, it seems that it does not fall foul of this infinite regress 
(vicious or not). The first (1) of these assumptions is that relations are entities 
that relate and connect their relata. This presupposition involves two things at 
least: (1.1) relations are entities (reification of relations), (1.2) every relation is a 
genuine relating and connecting entity in such a manner that it unites itself, a 
and b into relational complex aRb. (1.2) entails (1.1) because it involves the 
commitment that relations are existences. The other assumption (2) is, as was 
seen above, that necessarily, if a relation relates and connects a and b, it itself 
                                                
8 The same holds about every rn on an infinite number of levels; every connecting by relational 
entity rn unfolds an infinitely complex tree structure. 
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is connected and related to both a and b.9 (2) presupposes (1.1), since if a 
relation is itself connected to both of them, the relation must be an entity; 
non-entity cannot connect distinct entities. Only as constituents of what there 
is (entities), relations can connect their relata. 
 
3. Could One Avoid Bradley’s Trap? 
A good start for not falling afoul of Bradley’s relation regress is therefore to 
show that there may be related entities without there being any reified relation that 
relates and connects them (cf. Lowe 2006, 30). Then (1.1), (1.2) and (2) would be 
rejected since (1.2) and (2) presuppose (1.1). These putative relations would 
not relate by existing and by being connectors: they do not connect and unite 
distinct entities into relational complexes. Rather than an individual relational 
complex entity, these related entities form only a plurality. In a word, these 
relations are metaphysically speaking relatednesses of entities without relating 
and connecting entities. Still these relatednesses may be called relations since 
we can talk about them by means of relational predicate terms, which is a 
familiar possibility from the several different views of “internal relations”. 
Neither does it follow that these relations do not mark any difference in being 
because they may mark a difference in how the world is even if they in 
themselves do not contribute to what there is in the world (see more below). As 
such, Bradley’s point above that non-entities cannot connect does not really 
target them: “And, if you take it [a relation] as a kind of medium of 
unsubstantial atmosphere, it is a connexion no longer.” (AR, III, 28.) 
However, this is only a start. It is also necessary to show that the relata of 
these possible relations do not launch any vicious infinite regress. In Chapter 
III, Bradley considers two ways in which this might happen. The first way is 
the relata regress discussed below that the relata are relational in nature 
(ontologically complex), which leads to an infinitely complex, non-terminating 
tree of alleged relations and their relata. The second way is that a or b bears 
some other relation than r to some entity distinct from a or b, which re-
launches the infinite regress. In the first part of Chapter III, no qualities 
without relations, Bradley argues that one possibility of this is that the 
difference in nature between a and b is due to an entity distinct from them 
                                                
9 We omit the critical discussion of this principle since such a discussion is not needed for the 
purposes of this paper. 
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(e.g. an idealist view that the understanding distinguishes them), to which a 
and b have to bear some other relation than difference in nature (AR, III, 24).  
It seems to us that there can hold relations that fall afoul of neither the 
relation nor the relata regress. This idea is familiar from internal relations (we 
do not discuss the definition of internal relations since our focus is elsewhere). 
Let us also be as sure as possible that at least some relations are not subject to 
Bradley’s entire reductio of relations. First, it appears to be metaphysically 
possible that entities are numerically distinct without these entities involving a 
relational structure, composing an individual relational complex and reifying 
the relation of numerical distinctness, which would launch an infinite regress. 
Secondly, it seems to us that these numerically distinct entities can stand in 
other relations than numerical distinctness without an infinite relation regress 
ensuing. These metaphysically possible distinct entities would be 
metaphysically simple: they would have no metaphysical constituents 
whatsoever. Let us take a schematic example. 
Assume that particulars t and u exist. Assume further that both t and u 
are metaphysically simple: t is identified with some particular nature P and u is 
identified with some particular nature Q in such a way that P and Q are thin 
natures in every metaphysically possible respect. On this assumption, t, u, P 
and Q do not divide into constituents that are distinct in any metaphysical 
sense. This assumption is part of the standard trope theory, but a realist may 
also hold it if P and Q are construed as universals. 
Suppose that the difference in nature of P and Q consists of nothing but 
P and Q themselves. In other words, P and Q are different in nature for the 
fact that they are essentially certain thin natures. But the difference in nature 
of P and Q is not an additional entity to t and u. Bradley’s supposition (1.1) is 
not true about it. That P and Q are different in nature means nothing but that 
there holds a certain relation in the world: P and Q are different in nature. 
Neither does this difference make P and Q different in nature, nor what they 
are; rather, the obtaining of their difference in nature consists of nothing other 
than the existence of P and Q. Nothing else than the existence of P and Q is 
metaphysically necessary or sufficient for their difference in nature. As thin 
natures, P and Q are intrinsically non-relational so no regress of relations and 
their relata can be generated in them. At least in this respect, our starting 
assumption seems to represent a metaphysically possible matter of fact. 
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Bradley would not be happy with this. He would be quick to point out 
that by the principle of the non-identity of discernibles (the contrapositive of 
Leibniz’s law: the indiscernibility of identicals), it follows that t and u are 
numerically distinct. So there is another relation holding in our example, the 
relation of numerical distinctness, and it is that relation that generates an 
infinite relation regress. However, here we can insist against Bradley that the 
generation of an infinite relation regress is not necessary in this case. Both the 
difference in nature of P and Q and the numerically distinctness of t and u 
consists of nothing but P/t and Q/u themselves, which are non-relational in 
nature and do not generate relations that would lead to an infinite regress. 
Numerical distinctness or the plurality of numerically distinct P/t and Q/u is 
not an entity either. 
 
4. Relata Regress 
Against this insistence, Bradley advances a relata-regress argument in the 
second part of his reductio of relations, where he argues that qualities with 
relations are not fully intelligible. His point is that the difference in nature and 
numerical distinctness of a simple relatum from the other simple relatum are 
numerically distinct aspects of the former simple relatum. In our schematic 
example, t’s difference in nature and numerical distinctness from u, are 
numerically distinct aspects of t. As such, t is not simple but complex: it 
consists of two aspects that are related by numerical distinctness. The same 
holds of these two aspects and so on. Hence, an infinite regress of relations 
and their relata within t ensues: “We, in brief, are led by a principle of fission 
which conducts us to no end.” (AR, III, 26) The key move in Bradley’s 
argument to this result is that as “a it [t] is the difference on which distinction 
is based, while as α it is the numerical distinctness that results from 
connexion.” (Ibid.) 
Bradley clearly thinks, even if he does not say it, that this infinite regress 
in t is vicious. He says that the relatum, t in our example, loses “its unity” 
because t has “a diversity within its own nature”, which is “fatal to the 
internal unity of” t (AR, III, 26–27). It “demands a new relation, and so on 
without limit. In short, qualities in a relation have turned out as unintelligible 
as were qualities without one.” (AR, III, 27.) These passages tell us not only 
that Bradley thinks the infinite regress is vicious but that it is vicious since it 
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turns t into an infinitely complex, non-terminating tree of alleged relations 
and their relata. If this infinite regress ensues, it is a serious problem on 
Bradley’s plausible view that the relata of any given relation should be unities. 
This time the tree has the following structure, where an is the difference on 
which the relation of numerical distinctness is based, while as αn it is the aspect 
of the numerical distinctness that results from a relation of numerical 
distinctness rn: 
 
Level 0 t=aRα 
Level 1 a=a1R1α1 α=a2R2α2 
Level 2 a1=a3R3α3 α1=a4R4α4 a2=a5R5α5 α2=a6R6α6 
…  
 
Regardless of his reasons for it, Bradley is correct that this relata regress 
would be vicious if it went through. As in the case of the relation regress, there 
is type-identity in the explanandum and explanans. Here the explanandum is the 
unity of a distinct entity t as a relatum of the difference in nature and 
numerical distinctness between t and u, given t’s ontological structure aRα. 
This is an instance of the complex-unity problem, which we characterized in 
the Introduction. The explanans is the unity of distinct entities an and αn, which 
have a similar ontological structure to t (two entities related by numerical 
distinctness). The explanandum and each element of the explanans are of the 
same type; the latter is just repeated in an infinite number of times. The 
problem with this, as in the case of the relation regress, is that this is a 
metaphysical explanation failure. The complex-unity of a distinct entity is left 
without explanation; it does not shed any light on this complex-unity problem 
to repeat infinitely what the problem is.10 Consequently, on the assumption 
that the infinite regress is generated, nothing about the complex unity of any 
distinct entity in the infinite tree, including t, is explained metaphysically. 
It is a different question whether the relata of a relation, a and α for 
example, have to be unities, which the viciousness of the relata regress clearly 
presupposes. This is a requirement that is not without its merits. If the relata 
                                                
10 Recently, the complex-unity problem is taken up in the discussion on the different answers to 
van Inwagen’s (1990) Special Composition Question. Metaphysicians attempt to lay down the 
non-mereological conditions that the parts of a complex entity must fulfil in order to constitute a 
complex unity, i.e., to satisfy the conditions of restricted composition. 
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were not unities, what would be related (e.g. what would be numerically 
distinct)? At least before anyone can come up with an account, the answer is: 
no entities. It does not help to point out that then the apparently two-place 
relation rn would turn into an n-place relation holding between pluralities 
instead of two complex unities. These n-places have to be occupied by unities, 
for which no metaphysical explanation is reached if the infinite regress 
ensues.11 So if Bradley’s argument regarding t went through, we would be in 
fact dealing with a vicious infinite regress. Both t and u would exchange their 
intelligibility as unities for an infinitely complex non-terminating tree of 
alleged relations and their relata in both t and u.  
Accordingly, let us judge this argument by Bradley. Then we shall see 
that his reasoning may be resisted: this relata regress does not get off the 
ground in the case of t and u in our schematic example. His move that t’s 
numerical distinctness from u introduces a distinct aspect to t is not easy to 
understand, but a reasonable reading, put in terms of our example, is the 
following. Bradley begins with the assumption that t’s nature is different from 
u. He argues that a relation of numerical distinctness holds between t and u by 
the principle of non-identity of discernibles and the holding of the relation of 
difference in nature between t and u. The holding of numerical distinctness, in 
turn, introduces the aspect of numerical distinctness (from u) into t; this 
holding is constitutive of the aspect of t that it is numerically distinct from u. 
Therefore there are two aspects in t and “these different aspects are not each 
the other, nor again is either” t (AR, III, 26). 
It is hard to see how this reasoning by Bradley could be solid. It rests on 
the premise that the holding of numerical distinctness between t and u is 
constitutive of the aspect of t that t is distinct from u. However, Bradley does 
not give us any reason to think that this is so. Furthermore, it is a strange view 
indeed that a non-entity, such as the relation of numerical distinctness, could 
make a difference to what there is. But Bradley clearly supposes that the 
relation of numerical distinctness does make a difference to what there is; 
                                                
11 It does not do to respond to Bradley that the relata an and αn are relations (relations all the way 
down). This view is endorsed e.g. by Simon Saunders, James Ladyman and Don Ross, who are 
structural realists (Saunders 2003, 129; Ladyman & Ross 2007, 155). This is not assumed to be 
ruled out by Bradley’s argument here. Rather, the heart of the problem is not the relational or 
non-relational nature of the relata. It is, to repeat, that there is no metaphysical explanation for 
the unity of the relata, relations or not. 
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perhaps he thinks it as an entity since he speaks about it as a “connexion” in 
the previous quote. As this may be reasonably denied, we conclude that 
Bradley has not succeeded in arguing that t’s difference in nature and 
numerical distinctness from u make t relational in nature and infinitely 
ontologically complex. Consequently, his relata regress, vicious or not, does 
not get off the ground. 
 
5. Formal Ontological Relations 
Do our replies to Bradley mean that difference in nature and numerical 
distinctness are properties of their relata? They must be something and the 
only reasonable option seems to be that they are properties of their relata, 
which, in turn, would subject them to Bradley’s objection that relations 
cannot be properties of their relata. This objection occurs in his footnote just 
before the relation regress (AR, III, 27). The relevant part of the objection 
would be that “the problem of inherence would break out in an aggravated 
form.” (Ibid.) Is not this exactly the case with difference in nature and 
numerical distinctness? 
Our reply to this possible objection is that difference in nature and 
numerical distinctness are not entities of any category (constituents of what 
there is). Rather, they are ways of the being of entities (how they exist), in 
contradistinction to what exists: that t exists, for instance, as different in nature 
from u. As such, difference in nature and numerical distinctness are not to be 
categorised as properties, which their relata would bear. So this objection of 
Bradley just does not arise in their case. 
Still Bradley would not be happy (would an existence monist ever be 
with an argument defending pluralism?). He would insist that t and u are not 
simple since they have a dual nature, this time because of their numerical 
identity and difference in nature from each other. So there is a third relation in 
addition to difference in nature and numerical distinctness in our picture: the 
(logical) relation of numerical identity. “Inside” both t and u “we must 
distinguish its own quality and its otherness.” (AR, III, 24.) Entity t is identical 
with P, entity u is identical with Q and t/P is different from u/Q. There are 
different and hence distinct entities in them that constitute their numerical 
identity (t is t and u is u) and difference in nature (t is different in nature from 
u) in the same manner as in the case of difference in nature and numerical 
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distinctness just above. “And if so, then the unsolved problem breaks out 
inside each quality, and separates each into two qualities in relation.” (Ibid.) 
To be precise, Bradley does not speak about any infinite regress ensuing, 
vicious or not, in this context. It is easy to see, however, that he could be 
arguing for it along the lines of the argument discussed above that difference 
in nature and numerical distinctness make relata lose their needed unity. 
Our reply to Bradley here is that he just cannot be seen to advance any 
argument to the result that the mere joint existence of t and u as identified 
with P and Q in our example would not be metaphysically sufficient for the 
holding of numerical identity of t and u, respectively, and their difference in 
nature from each other. He merely asserts that it would not be sufficient 
without t and u dividing into numerically distinct entities. So Bradley has not 
shown that the numerical identity of t and u and their difference in nature 
bestow a dual nature to them. This argument of Bradley may be resisted. No 
infinite regress is generated, vicious or not. 
Actually, difference in nature, numerical distinctness and numerical 
identity belong to what are called “formal ontological relations” in the 
contemporary metaphysical literature. Formal ontological relations spell out 
what E. J. Lowe’s calls “ontological form”, which he distinguishes from 
“ontological content” (2006, 48; cf. Smith & Grenon 2004).12 This distinction 
is analogical to the logical contrast between the non-logical content of a 
proposition and its logical form (Smith & Murray 1981; Smith & Mulligan 
1983; Lowe 2006, 48). It is to be insisted, however, that ontological and 
logical form should not be conflated because the former is the form of being in 
general, whereas the latter is much more restricted: the form of truth-bearers 
(if they are entities) (Smith & Mulligan 1983, 73; Smith 2005, ch. 5; Lowe 
2006, 48). 
It is not an easy task to give a comprehensive account of the distinction 
between ontological content and ontological form. However, a 
comprehensive account is not necessary for the present purposes. Suffice it to 
introduce the distinction by way of examples.13 One may consider anything 
                                                
12 Husserl’s distinction between ontological content and ontological form was brought into 
contemporary discussion by Barry Smith, together with David Murray (1981) and Kevin 
Mulligan (1983). 
13 In fact, we believe that at least ontological form is a concept that cannot be given an 
eliminative non-circular definition. It is a primitive notion in formal ontology (or ideology). 
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one believes to exist. This entity adds to the entities one believes to exist. In 
one’s view, then, the entity is a part of the ontological content of the world: 
what beings there are (“ontology” in Quinean/Lewisian parlance, one makes 
an “ontological commitment”). 
For example, if one believes in the existence of Olli Koistinen, one 
believes that there is an entity to which “Olli Koistinen” refers. One holds a 
belief about the ontological content of the world. If one also believes that Olli 
Koistinen exists as having numerical identity (he is the same with himself), one 
holds a belief about the ontological form of the world.14 This is a belief about 
how Olli Koistinen exists as a constituent of the world (“ideology”), that is, as 
being the same with himself. One does not believe in any entity in addition to 
Olli Koistinen; rather, the belief concerns Olli Koistinen’s form of being as 
being the same with itself. It can be understood as a formal feature of 
existence, what it is to be the same with itself. Arguably, further examples of 
formal features of existence are being one (unity), being individual (having 
numerical identity and being one) and being particular (and being universal for the 
realist). In Lowe’s terms, all these are expressed by “formal ontological 
predicates”, which apply but do not refer to entities (Lowe 2006, 193). In our 
example, “is numerically identical” applies to Olli Koistinen and the sentence 
“Olli Koistinen is numerically identical” is true about him.15 
Accordingly, formal ontological relations may be characterized as 
formal relational features of existence. Take numerical distinctness as an 
example: it should be seen as how an entity exists, that is, as numerically 
distinct from another entity. If this formal ontological relation holds, it is part 
of the formal structure of the world: the world includes these two entities, 
which exist as not one and the same entity. In addition to numerical 
distinctness and difference in nature, possible formal ontological relations 
include numerical identity, relations between categories in different category 
systems (e.g. instantiation and characterization in the Neo-Aristotelian 
ontological square, different ontological dependencies), similarity or 
resemblance, quantitative relations (e.g. proportion), composition, 
                                                
14 In principle, it seems not to be necessary for believing in an entity to hold that it has numerical 
identity since it appears to be possible to believe in the existence of something as a mere unity (cf. 
Lowe 2006, 75). 
15 If this sentence is true, there are in principle several possible semantic accounts for its truth. In 
this paper, we set this semantic question aside. 
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constitution and mereological relations. Of these, at least dependences spell 
out the possible ways of existence of entities rather than their actual ways of 
existence. 
Which formal ontological relations hold, what the formal structure of 
the world is, is dependent on which formal ontological category system is true. 
Still, formal ontological relations are necessary for every category system 
according to which there is something in the world, as Lowe argues (2006, 
34).16 Actually, disputes between different ontological category systems are 
partly disagreements of what the (basic) formal ontological relations are. 
Whatever formal ontological relations obtain at the end of the day, they are in 
general good candidates for relations in the world that do not fall afoul of 
Bradley’s reductio of relations, as we have argued.17 First, they are not subject 
to the relation regress because they are not entities of any category. Secondly, 
at least in the case of simple entities, they may hold between simple entities 
without falling prey to Bradley’s reductio of relata. 
 
6. Coda: Relations in Thought and Language 
It seems to us that Bradley’s last resort at this point would be to point out that 
as human beings we have to think and talk about our schematic scenario, 
formal ontological relations and their relata. This re-launches his relation 
regress for two reasons. (1) There has to hold some relation between our 
thinking or talking about the scenario and the scenario (e.g. representation, 
reference, truth, truth-making). (2) Thinking and talking about the scenario 
and formal ontological relations involves relations since they involve 
predications that have relational structure. When we think or talk about the 
scenario, for instance, we predicate over t and u, P and Q. When we do this, 
                                                
16 Arguably, even an existence monist like Bradley should accept the formal ontological relation 
of numerical identity at least because there is one self-identical entity in the world. It is also quite 
unclear whether the one could exist without any difference or distinction in it. If it could not, it 
would involve formal ontological relations. 
17 In some category systems, the holding of formal ontological relations results in the existence of 
complex unities. Ontological dependences are typically such formal ontological relations. They 
spell out how entities can exist as constituents of the world. It is to be emphasised, however, that 
these formal ontological relations ought not to be identified with these complex unities. Neither 
are these complex unities relational complexes. So no holding of formal ontological relation 
should be identified with the existence of a relational complex unity. The (1.2) assumption of 
Bradley’s relation regress does not hold true of them. 
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something works as a subject and something as a predicate of the subject. 
Therefore there must hold relations between predicates and subjects. Bradley 
believes that “the conclusion to which I am brought [at the end of Chapter III 
right after his relation regress argument] is that a relational way of thought–
any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations–must give 
appearance, and not truth.” (AR, III, 28.) 
These two points raise extremely difficult questions in epistemology, 
philosophy of mind, theory of judgement or assertion and philosophy of 
language, which obviously cannot be discussed in a paper in metaphysics. We 
can point out, however, as an initial response to Bradley, that our argument 
has shown that at least some formal ontological relations are, indeed, 
intelligible. So the possible problems in relational thought and talk are not 
relevant in this respect. There are two different things here: the possibility of 
fully intelligible relational thought and talk and the possibility of related being. 
Even if the former were impossible, it does not follow that the latter is not 
possible, without some further (idealist) premise. Moreover, it is not necessary 
that predications or judgments are relational complexes: complex entities with 
a relational ontological structure. First, it can be reasonably denied that 
predications or judgements are entities. Secondly, according to Allard (2005, 




In this paper, we have reconstructed Bradley’s relation and relata regress, 
including their structure, and defended their nature as vicious infinite regress 
arguments. If they go through, they are vicious infinite regresses since the 
explanandum and explanans are type-identical in the regresses and this type 
identity is repeated in an infinite number of times. Therefore no step is really 
taken to metaphysically explain the initial explanandum. 
Our intention has not been to solve the problems that these regress 
arguments pose. We have limited ourselves to the argument for the result that 
there are possibly ways of standing in relation in the world that escape both 
regresses and Bradley’s entire reductio of relations. At least difference in nature, 
numerical distinctness and identity of ontologically simple entities count as 
such relations. Since they are examples of formal ontological relations, this 
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suggests that formal ontological relations in general are good candidates for 
relations that do not fall afoul of either regress. 
 
University of Tampere 
University of Helsinki 
 
Bibliography 
Allard, J. (2005). The Logical Foundations of Bradley’s Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and 
Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism. Volume 1:  Nominalism and Realism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1997). The World States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Betti, A. (2015). Against Facts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bliss, R.L. (2013). “Viciousness and the Structure of Reality”, Philosophical Studies 166 (2), 
399–418. 
Bradley, F. H. (1883). Principles of Logic. London: Oxford University Press. 
Bradley, F. H. (1897). Appearance and Reality (second edition). London: George Allen & 
Unwin. 
Cameron, R. (2008). “Turtles All The Way Down: Regress, Priority and 
Fundamentality”, The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230), 1–14. 
Candlish, S. & P. Basile (2013). “Francis Herbert Bradley”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/bradley/ 
Gaskin, R. (2008). The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ladyman, J. & D. Ross (2007). Every Thing Must Go. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lowe, E. J. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Saunders, S. (2003). “Structural Realism, Again”, Synthese 136, 127–133. 
Smith, B. (2005). “Against Fantology”, in J. Marek & E. M. Reicher (eds.), Experience and 
Analysis. Vienna: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 153–170. 
Smith, B. & P. Grenon (2004). “The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological Relations”, 
Dialectica 58 (3), 279–296. 
Smith, B. & K. Mulligan (1983). “Framework for Formal Ontology”, Topoi 2, 73–85. 
Smith, B. & D. Murray (1981). “Logic, Form and Matter”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume, 55, 47–74. 
van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Wieland, J-W. & Betti, A. (2008). “Relata-specific Relations: A Response to Vallicella”, 
Dialectica 62 (4), 509–524. 
